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ABSTRACT 
The concept of Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) is largely 
accepted to be the foundation on which manufacturing companies should 
build the Factory of the Future. Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) are 
used as a major element in a technology-push strategy pursued to obtain a 
competitive edge by focusing on flexible production automation. In this 
paper we discuss the need for corporate policy makers to link their techno-
logy-push strategy with their global business strategy and base their de-
cisions to invest in flexible automation on sound arguments. 
1 • INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturing ranks among the principal real-wealth producing acti-
vities of most industrialized countries. It has been estimated (Hatvany 
et al. (1983)) that manufacturing indeed accounts for about one-third of 
the gross national product. Various forces seem to push the manufacturing 
industry towards an increasing reliance on technology as a means for de-
veloping a competitive edge. 
First, there seems to be a general agreement that technology is a 
major contributor to productivity, even though there may be considerable 
differences of opinion on the actual amount of the contribution (e.g. accor-
ding to Myers (1983), estimates of the contribution of technology to impro-
vement of productivity in the United States have varied from 30 percent to 
80 percent). In addition, management faces the disturbing fact that ineffi-
cient production technology is often cited as one of the main reasons for 
closing a plant. A recent survey of 171 of the more than 1,000 plant closings 
by Fortune "500" industrials during the 1970s for example, reveals that, while 
drops in sales volume and high labor costs contribute to many plant closings, 
the clear culprit in closings of both new and old facilities, ~s an ineffi-
cient production technology (Schmenner (1983)). In nearly half of all clo-
sings (46 percent) the factory slipped into inefficient or outdated production 
technology, layout, or materials handling. 
Second, corporate policy makers face the fact that especially in dis-
crete part manufacturing there is much potential for serious cost reduction 
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(Herroelen (1983)). Carter (1972) has shown that, when the life of the 
average work-piece in small-batch metal cutting production shops is analyzed, 
only about 5 % of its time is actually spent on machine tools, and of that 
5 %, only about 30% (or 1.5% of the overall time) is actually spent as 
productive time ln removing metal. This supports the view that many Western 
small-batch manufacturing job shops, although very flexible, can hardly be 
called efficient or productive. While in the traditional Western view, flexi-
bility and efficiency are 180 degrees apart, in the Japanese approach the 
two seem to be only 30 degrees apart - more in harmony than in conflict 
(Schonberger (1983), Wheelwright (1981)). This apparent success of the Japanese 
manufacturing industry, relying largely on flexibility and integration, to-
gether with the increasing world business competition are crucial incentives 
for the many recent efforts to renew the manufacturing effectiveness of the 
Western World. The apparent conflict between manufacturing flexibility and 
productive efficiency which has long bedeviled the industry, seems no longer 
inevitable. The so-called Factory of the Future is now cited to be the key 
to this renewal and is accredited to hold all potentials to resolve the con-
flict. 
It is a firm belief that the Factory of the Future will evolve prlmarl-
ly through successive refinement and integration of existing design and manu-
facturing functions and technologies. The concept of Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing (CIM) is largely accepted to be the foundation on which manu-
facturing companies should build this Factory of the Future (Gunn (1982)). 
CIM represents the integration of information technology with robotics, auto-
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mated materials handling, the use of computers in design (CAD) and manu-
facturing (CAM), modern manufacturing planning and control systems and the 
principles of cellular production based on group technology. Flexible 
Manufacturing Systems (FMSs) - the Japanese increasingly use the term Factory 
Mechatronics Systems (Tsuda (1983)) - are crucial links in this integration. 
In general, a full-fledged flexible manufacturing system (FMS) consists 
of a group of processing stations - numerically controlled machines, machining 
centers with automatic tool interchange capabilities and robots - linked to-
gether with an automatic material (workpart) handling system, that operates 
as an integrated system under computer control (Herroelen (1983)). FMSs are 
designed and developed to produce small- and mid-sized batches of several dif-
ferent part types with the efficiency of automated mass production (transfer 
lines) and the flexibility of a job shop. The FMS is considered as a crucial 
technology-push strategy for a discrete parts manufacturing company that wants 
to obtain a competitive edge by focusing on flexible automation. 
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the need for corporate poli-
cy makers to link their technology-push strategy with their globai business 
strategy and to base their decisions to invest in the emerging production tech-
nologies on sound arguments. In discussing how this may be accomplished, our 
argument is developed in the following steps. In the next section we discuss 
some crucial implications of a technology-push strategy and contrast it with 
a more market oriented demand-pull strategy, reaching the overall conclusion 
that an offensive use of flexible production automation enables a company to 
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pursue a combination strategy which brings to bear many beneficial strate-
gic factors. According to our arguments that investments in flexible auto-
mation require a careful analysis, the third section elaborates on the basic 
ingredients of the required investment analysis and the intelligent use of 
the discounted cash flow method. The last section is then reserved for our 
overall conclusions. 
2. IMPLICATlONS OF A TECHNOLOGY-PUSH STRATEGY 
Previous research suggests a strong relationship between the characte-
ristics of a product and its manufacturing process. According to the argu-
ments of Abernathy (1978), Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a, 1979b) and Utterback 
and Abernathy (1975), manufacturing processes, no less than products turned 
out, go through a life cycle evolution. Initially non-standardized, often 
exclusive products are manufactured using uncoordinated, often manual produc-
tion processes. The product innovation rate fu high and is stimulated by an 
expanding market demand, the ultimate potential of which is not yet fully re-
cognized. The required product innovation insights are obtained mainly by 
recognizing the relevant product requirements rather than by new scientific 
developments or advanced technologies. As the industry further develops, 
market uncertainty declines. Gradually a dominant product design evolves, 
reducing the need for real product innovation. Competition in mature markets 
is now largely based on low prices. This invokes further process innovations. 
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As price competition increases, the production process becomes more capital 
intensive focusing on low-cost production. This finally leads to a rigid 
state characterized by only marginal product and process innovations. 
It has been argued (Ferdows (1983)) that a productive unit, evolving 
primarily along the lines explained above, may be caught in a vicious circle 
which demands more investments while profitability declines. Various strate-
gies may be used for avoiding or breaking out of the vicious circle. In par-
ticular, the technology-push strategy which focuses on flexible production 
automation in order to increase the manufacturing flexibility to be able to 
produce more diverse products or change volume throughput, lies at the heart 
of the Flexible Manufacturing Systems concept - nowadays cited as the "life-
line to 21st century manufacturing technology" and a crucial link in the 
evolution towards the Factory of the Future. Such a strategy implies that 
the productive unit aims at combining the inherent flexibility of job shop 
production with the efficiency of flow and transfer lines used for mass pro-
duction. For a thorough review of the technology behind such a combination, 
we refer the reader to Herroelen (1983). As already mentioned above, flexible 
manufacturing systems and the use of reprogrammable robots show great promise 
in this respect. The overall concept of Computer Integrated Manufacturing 
(CIM), integrating computer aided design and manufacturing (CAD/CAM), robotics, 
automated materials handling, cellular production principles based on group 
technology, suitable production planning and control and advanced local area 
network computer technology, holds the promise to adapt faster to volume 
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throughput changes and product differentiation and allows to increase the 
reliability, quality, and customer service at a competitive price. 
Employing flexible manufacturing technology as an integrated, offen-
sive strategy is a major departure from the traditional view, which merely 
uses technology as a basic element in a rather protective strategy to achieve 
overall cost leadership in an industry. This narrow-minded view of becoming 
a "low-cost producer" is vulnerable to various risks. If no sufficient care 
~s taken in pursuing a technology-push strategy, technology-push may turn out 
to be a technology trap. 
The pitfalls of technology based cost leadership 
Overall cost leadership, the first generic corporate strategy listed 
by Porter (1980), is based on exploiting the scale economies associated with 
high-volume production, positioning the productive unit as low as possible 
on the learning curve, vigorous cost control and extensive investment in 
equipment and machines. Such a strategy requires a high relative market share 
and management expertise with respect to production engineering, production 
management and inventory control. 
A strategy which overemphasizes technology-based cost leadership is 
subject to many risks, among which the following two deserve our special at-
tention. First, process technology is not necessarily an entry barrier. People 
often move from one firm to another carrying their employer's process technolo-
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gy with them (Zannetos (1984)). Industry newcomers or followers may take 
advantage of low-cost learning through imitation or through their ability 
to invest ln s.tate-of-the-art facilities (Porter (1980)). Newcomers may 
soon reach the same learning curve position as flrms that have been operat-
ing in the industry for a long time. The$ 1,500 cost advantage of Japanese 
over Western car producers illustrate this point (Abernathy, Clark and 
Kantrow (1983)). Steel production provides another illustration: the cost 
advantage of the U.S. over Japan which existed in 1956 has been transformed 
into a net cost disadvantage in 1976 (Thompson (1984)). Second, a number of 
cost elements are heavily influenced by external factors such as inflation, 
labor force agreements on wage level and working hours and increasing raw 
material prices. Such an inflation in costs is largely beyond management 
control and may seriously hamper a cost leadership strategy. 
Increasing capital intensity and lower return 
Employing technology as a strategic tool leads to an lncrease in capi-
tal intensity, Recent studies (Gale (1980), Porter (1980)) have shown that 
very capital intensive firms are not necessarily characterized by a greater 
earning capacity, mainly due to the following reasons. First, capital in-
tensive firms focusing on low cost production and overall cost leadership, 
may become the victim of an agressive low price competition with negative ef-
fects on company return especially during periods of depression and underuti-
lization. Second, a technology based strategy leads into increased fixed costs 
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which is normally translated into higher company risk. Third, where pro-
cess technology is not necessarily an entry barrier, the resulting in-
creased capital intensity may become an important exit barrler. Decisions 
to disinvest are very complicated, especially when heavy investments have 
been made in dedicated, specialized equipment. 
The implications of vertical integration 
Apparently the impact of automated manufacturing in general and of 
Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMSs) in particular is mainly found in small 
and medium batch production, more precisely the manufacturing of elementary 
parts and components. As such, automated manufacturing may hold strong 
tendencies towards vertical backward integration. A productive unit may ln-
deed be tempted to install flexible automation within its own confines in 
order to reap the benefits of controlling and coordinating the manufacturing 
and delivery of components and parts. Vertical backward integration indeed 
has important generic benefits (Porter (1980)) such as lower transaction 
costs, reduction in the uncertainty of supply and deliveries, better coordi-
nation in establishing production plans and controlling production schedules 
and better technical cooperation and tuning of the operations ln case of in-
novation and launching of new products. 
However, there are also some risks involved with a high degree of 
vertical backward integration. First, vertical backward integration requires 
heavy investments. Investment intensityanvestments as a percentage of sales 
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turnover)is known to increase with increasing degree of vertical backward 
integration (Buzzell (1983)). Second, the efficient scale will be diffe-
rent for assembly than for component manufacturing. As mentioned by Porter 
(1980), the volume of purchases of the firm contemplating backward integra-
tion must be large enough to support an in-house component supplying unit 
large enough to reap sufficient economies of scale in manufacturing the parts 
and components, or the firm faces a dilemma. Either it must build an in-
house facility at a serious cost disadvantage, or it must bear the possible 
risk of selling some of the production of the upstream unit in the open 
market. Hence the firm must analyze whether it is not better to rely on 
subcontractors for the supply of parts and components. The subcontracting 
task can be accomplished by a small or medium sized firm that may reach an 
efficient scale by performing the subcontracting activity for a number of 
companies within the same sector. 
In short it should be mentioned that a high degree of vertical back-
ward integration is mostly translated in lower return, unless the firm has 
a relatively large market share. This ts in strong contrast with vertical 
forward, customer oriented integration, for which the investment requirements 
seem to be lower and which indeed has a positive effect on company return. 
Technology-push and demand~pull 
The above remaks concerning the risks involved in employing technology 
mainly to achieve overall cost leadership stand ~n strong contrast with the 
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advantages generally attributed to a more market-oriented, demand-pull, 
differentiation type of strategy. Differentiating the product or service 
offering of the firm lS listed as the second generic strategy by Porter 
(1980). This strategy tries to obtain a unique product position within the 
industry through the creation of an exclusive brand image, brand loyalty 
by customers, an emphasis on customer service and an efficient dealer net-
work, quality promotion or technical product superiority. Such a strategy 
requires strong marketing abilities, leadership in product design and engi-
neering and a lot of creativity. Differentiation, if achieved, is a viable 
strategy for earning above-average returns. Although not ignorable, costs 
are no longer the primary strategic target. This type of demand-pull stra-
tegy is generally evaluated as successful (Peters and Waterman (1982)). 
Until recently, the overall cost leadership and the differentiation 
strategy were largely considered to be incompatible. Either a productive 
unit operates as a rather rigid cost leader without achieving differentiation, 
or it gains flexibility through differentiation at the price of loosing over-
all cost leadership. Automated manufacturing, in particular the use of flexible 
production automation, allows to resolve this dilemma and enables a company 
to pursue a type of combination strategy. As stated by Skinner (1984), this 
can bring to bear many other strategic factors besides achieving low cost; 
to wit, superior quality, shorter delivery cycles, lower inventories, shorter 
new product development cycles, and new production economics, allowing for a 
richer product mix, more product proliferation and more customer specials. 
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Using computerized manufacturing and flexible automation as a power-
ful competitive weapon cannot be done without a careful economic evaluation 
and a thorough analysis of the investments involved. 
3. THE I1~STMENT DECISION 
A. What is different about investing in production technologies 
The investment in production technologies certainly is a strategic 
issue whose impact goes far beyond the strict evaluation of the equipment 
itself. A number of benefits are sometimes extremely difficult to measure 
such as improved manufacturing flexibility or benefits due to integration 
synergy. The introduction of computer aided manufacturing equipment influences 
the total organisation, the manufacturing system and certainly the type of 
products offered by the company. The risk pos1tion of the company may be 
changed because of uncertainties in market prospects and maybe because of 
changes 1n the cost structure due to a shift from variable to fixed costs. 
Because of all these factors mentioned above some people started having 
doubts about the suitability of the traditional capital budgeting techniques. 
We believe that this doubt is misplaced, we still have to depend on tradi-
tional capital budgeting techniques, such as discounted cash flow, to evaluate 
such proposals. What 1s needed is a much broader level of analysis (Gold 
(19~2)) than the one traditionally used in evaluating the purchase of a ma-
chine or single piece of equipment. A too narrow v1ew on the problem may 
either defer or even reject the purchase. 
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ln a recent art1cle Kaplan (1~83) states that " a narrow inter-
pretation may inhibit desirable investment projects. There is a danger 
from relying solely on the easily quantified savings 1n input factors, such 
as labor, energy, and materials, from new capital 1nvestments and not con-
sidering gains from improved manufacturing performance that are more diffi-
cult and subjective to quantify. Factors such as improved product quality, 
increased manufacturing flexibility, reduced inventory levels and the capa-
city for increased product innovations may be ignored because we have inade-
quate means for quantifying their benefits". Bylinsky (19B3) believes that 
one consequence of this myopia is apparent in the aging of the U.S. machine 
tool stock. 
As already suggested above, the investment in flexible manufacturing 
systems is a strategic decision and not a simple replacement problem. For 
the moment there is a missing link both in practice and in research between 
the firm's manufacturing strategy and the measurement of the manufacturing 
performance and the impact on the total organization. Just to illustrate 
this point we mention a number of unsolved problems. What is the relation-
ship between higher quality and (lower) costs ? What is the impact of flexible 
production automation on sales ? How to measure for example the inventory 
reduction through the introduction of a jusL-in-time system, which is made 
possible by flexible automation ? lfhat is thA impact of improved manufactur-
ing practices on the uncertainty in lead times and scr~p rates and consequently 
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the investment in safety stocks; 1n other words, what is the trade-off 
between reducing uncertainty and the investment 1n safety stocks ? 
B. The ingredients of a good investment analysis 
A good investment analysis must include the following considerations. 
1. Manufacturing policy and product strategy. 
Manufacturing costs are not always of pr1mary importance, Competi-
tive emphasis may be on marketing or on the development of unique high per-
formance, high technology products. On the other hand, a low cost strategy 
may be imposed on the company forcing it to keep manufacturing costs at a 
minimum. The precise nature of the manufacturing system tasks will be dif-
ferent in both situations. This illustrates that one of the most important top 
management decisions has to do with ~he matching of manufacturing policies 
and product strategies. This choice problem is beautifully described by 
Stobaugh and Telesio (1983). The answer tofue question determines whether 
computerized manufacturing is an important issue or not. In this article, 
we assume that the company operates in an industry characterized by tough 
price competition, high quality standards, and a reliable delivery perfor-
mance, making it necessary to pursue a low cost strategy. 
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2. Cash flow analysis. 
It has been shown by many authors that accounting ratios such as 
return on investment or return on equity or earnings per share have serious 
shortcomings as financial standards to evaluate strategies or major in-
vestment proposals. Rappaport (1981) analyzed the Standard and Poor's 400 
industrial companies during 1974-1979. In 16 %of these companies stock-
holders realized negative rates of return from dividends plus capital losses 
and 35 % of the 172 companies stockholders' returns were inadequate to com-
pensate just for inflation. The point is that reported earnings are highly 
sensitive to accounting evaluation rules such as the LIFO and FIFO rule, 
historical costing or current costing, Capital expenses are depreciated over 
a number of years and are deducted from profits. Sometimes a time lag exists 
between the moment a liability is incurred and the moment the bill has to be 
paid, the same is true for payments of customers. These examples illustrate 
that companies can create net income in different ways, one way is by changing 
accounting conventions, this of course ~s not a gooo measure of the underlying 
economic health of the firm. 
The real measure of management success or the economic value of any 
investment is simply the anticipated cash flow discounted by the cost of ca-
pital. The discounted cash flow method considers besides the time value of 
money also the aspect of risk, The economic value to shareholders of alter-
native strategies can be assessed by estimating future cash flows. Although 
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some authors, consultants and managers may have some doubts about the 
applicability of the classical investment analysis tools, we argue that 
these techniques are still extremely important. 
3. Computerized manufacturing ~s still ~n an embryonic stage of development. 
For the moment not much experience has been gained in relation to 
investments in flexible automation equipment. Developments are still ~n an 
"embryonic" stage characterized by a high risk. Flexible automation projects 
are very risky at inception. The exact nature of the typical implementation 
problems has not extensively been documented so far. Correctly estimating 
the relevant cash flows in a hard nut to crac~. The attitude towards risk 
depends, among other factors, on the financial position of the company. This 
financial position depends on the current and planned product/market port-
folio. Top management must take care that the cash balance is maintained. 
This again illustrates the need to integratefue analysis in a company wide 
strategy. 
4o Computerized manufacturing as an epidemic process. 
The installation of integrated flexible automation equipment ~s not 
a static, once and for all type of decision. On the contrary it is a dynamic 
integrated type of decision. It is a time-phazed, continuous process ~n 
which capital outlays will be spread maybe over a 10 year time horizon. 
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Revenues will not be generated immediately, the implementation stage may 
take a long time. We have to ask managers to look into a far future and 
mechanical extrapolations of data ~n the past are of no help. Again this 
stresses the need of integration and a company wide view of this almost 
epidemic p.rocess. 
5, The need for a "what if not" analysis. 
Managers must include a "what if not" analysis. Suppose that a com-
pany decides not to invest in flexible automation. What are the consequen-
ces in terms of the competitive position of the firm ? wnat happens with 
the future cash flow ? What ~s the risk of being completely dominated by 
a competitor ? What are the company survival chances if it cannot compete 
with other low-cost companies ? 
Figure 1 illustrates two somewhat hypothetical cash flow streams for a ty-
pical productive unit resulting from two opposite scenarios. Curve (a) re-
presents the resulting cash flow stream given the scenario that the produc-
tive unit does not accept the proposals to invest in flexible production 
automation, while curve (b) denotes the cash flow stream for the opposite 
scenario. 
Although Figure 1 possibly refers to a somewhat extreme case, it clearly 
illustrates the possibility that the Net Present Value of scenario (a) is 
higher than the Net Present Value of scenario (b) given a specific time hori-
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and at the same time it ~s the source of criticism launched against the 
Discounted Cash Flow method. Who is indeed willing to strive against the 
stream ? What can be done about the observation above ? Of course mana-
gers should strive for a correct application of finance theory, First the 
time horizon needs to be selected very carefully. Given the dynamic, epi-
demic and almost contagious process, managers must be aware that computerized 
manufacturing implies long term investments (10- 15 years). Second, one has 
to be careful in selecting the discount rate (Myers (1984)). Our inability 
to look far into the future should not be translated into an unrealistically 
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high discount rate. An investment analysis always starts with a fore-
casting exercise; this can be very difficult but it must be done. The 
discount rate must take care of the risks involved; it must account for 
the fact that the company shiftS from a variable cost production system 
to a more fixed cost production system. It must also take care of the 
sensitivity of an investment's return to market movements. As was mentioned 
before,flexible automation investment projects are usually risky at incep-
tion but only of normal risk once the start-up is successfully passed. 
There are also high risks involved in case the company decides not to invest. 
All these observations must be included in the analysis. The best way to 
handle the problem is to go through a sensitivity analysis. Third, the curves 
in Figure 1 are highly influenced by the timing of the introduction. A 
project can be pffitponed for a year or more. Postponing the project is not 
necessarily a bad thing to do. More experience may become available, the 
prices of the equipment may go dow~ the software may become more reliable, 
a turn-key system may become available and so on. On the other hand, the 
decision to wait may hamper the company's competitive position. The company 
may loose its market share and even face the risk of being ruled out of busi-
ness. 
6. Production lS more than making costs. 
A final remark dealing with the investment ln production technologies 
has to do with the estimation of the cash flows. The central idea is that 
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production is much more than making costs. We too often evaluate pro-
posals based on cost criteria. The impact of automation on market share 
is often neglected. Quality improvement has to do with the competitive 
position and consequently with market share. A reduction in lead times is 
a competitive weapon which ~s finally rewarded on the market place, The 
same holds for shorter new product development cycles and a richer product 
mix. Managers are often surprised by the fact that the current ratio of 
inventory to sales is no better than it was 20 years ago. From a cost point 
of view, it seems that we are doing a lousy job. The reason for such an 
inventory behavior can be explained by the fact that service improved and 
that companies offer a much greater product variety. Flexible automation 
is more than a technology-push strategy, rather it is a means to combine 
the technology-push strategy with a demand-pull strategy. 
Of course, the cost aspects cannot be excluded from the analysis. 
It is important, however, to concentrate on the_right costs. On the average 
the structure of total manufacturing cost is as follows : 10 % direct labor, 
40 % indirect costs and 50 %materials. There are potential cost reductions 
for all three categories. The most difficult one to manage, however, are 
the indirect costs. That is exactly where most companies fail. Companies 
underestimate e.g. the time it takes to implement the system; the organisa-
tion must be changed, employees must be trained, a tremendous amount of soft-
ware must be developed, inventories will not go down automatically and so on. 
So there are plenty of reasons for a careful cost analysis. But as mentioned 
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already, production and automation ~s more than making costs; top mana-
gement must be convinced that flexible automation ~s generating cash as 
well. 
IVo CONCLUSIONS 
Corporate policy makers face the need to link their technology-
push strategy with their global business strategy. Employing flexible manu-
facturing technology as an integrated offensive strategy is a major depar-
ture from the traditional view which merely uses technology as a basic element 
in a rather protective strategy to achieve overall cost leadership. Such a 
strategy, if used properly, may enable a productive unit to avoid or break 
out of a vicious circle which demands more investments while profitability 
declines. It essentially allows the flexibility of small batch production 
to be combined with the efficiency of mass production and triggers many other 
strategic factors besides achieving low costs. 
Decisions to invest ~n flexible automation and computer integrated 
manufacturing systems must be based on sound arguments. Arguing that an in-
telligent use of the discounted cash flow method, combined with an overall 
strategic view, provides the basic course of action, it was emphasized that 
production is more than merely making costs and that flexible automation ~n­
vestments involve a dynamic, integrated type of decision. 
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The arguments developed in this paper should have made it very 
clear that the evaluation of investments in new technologies is a complex 
and risky task and certainly involves strategic decisions on the precise 
technology-push course to be followed. \~en a manufacturing company faces 
competitors who are avoiding or breaking out of a dangerous vicious circle 
by moving very fast towards the introduction of flexible manufacturing tech-
nology, it should realize that those competitors got away with the evaluation 
problem and are constantly acquiring a competitive edge. One of the crucial 
questions to be answered then is simply what will happen to the productive 
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